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RAY BLISS IN RETROSPECT 
BOOK REVIEW: WILLIAM L. HERSHEY & JOHN C. GREEN,
MR. CHAIRMAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RAY C. BLISS 
by Jonathan L. Entin* 
Ray Bliss was one of the most effective and respected political 
operatives in American history. His career spanned five decades, and his 
influence was in many ways more profound than that of other prominent 
figures like Mark Hanna and James Farley, who were primarily associated 
with specific presidents.1 Bliss made his mark as a party builder and 
modernizer. He engineered the Republican revival after Senator Barry 
Goldwater’s landslide loss to President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Before 
assuming leadership of the Republican National Committee in 1965, he 
had chaired the Ohio GOP for sixteen years. Working primarily behind 
the scenes, he was relatively unknown to the general public. 
I first heard of Bliss in 1962, when my suburban Boston high school 
debate partner—an ardent Republican and even more ardent Goldwater 
supporter—accurately predicted that the GOP would win big victories in 
Ohio that year because of Bliss.2 But I never knew many details about Ray 
* David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve
University. 
1. Hanna was the man behind William McKinley, and Farley played a similar role for
Franklin D. Roosevelt. See WILLIAM T. HORNER, OHIO’S KINGMAKER: MARK HANNA, MAN AND 
MYTH (2010); DANIEL SCROOP, MR. DEMOCRAT: JIM FARLEY, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS (2006). 
2. Lewie and I could hardly agree on the time of day, but we were an effective debating
combination because we had to work very hard to find arguments that both of us could support. He 
was deeply engaged in politics from an early age. Before starting high school, he obtained more than 
800 signatures on a petition to repeal a 50% pay raise that Massachusetts legislators had voted 
themselves. A state commission brought him in for questioning because officials assumed that anyone 
so young must have forged the signatures. Nothing came of the investigation, because there was 
nothing irregular to discover. Lewie was the straightest of straight arrows; he really had slogged door 
to door to persuade people to sign the petition, and the commission soon backed off. During the 
summer of 1963, while we were attending a two-week debate workshop in Washington, D.C., he 
snuck into the quarters of a very liberal college debate coach who was helping to run the program and 
taped a 7-by-9-foot picture of Barry Goldwater to the wall. And in 1964, Lewie briefly ran as an 
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Bliss. Now, longtime Ohio political reporter William L. Hershey and 
distinguished political scientist John C. Green (the director of the Ray C. 
Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron) have 
produced a highly informative biography that illuminates the work of a 
great party leader who strongly supported a healthy two-party system 
throughout his career in the trenches.3 
This review proceeds as follows. Part I offers an overview of the 
volume. This discussion covers only the highlights; the book offers a 
wealth of additional details, in bite-size chunks, that provide a broad 
perspective on Ohio and American political history during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century.4 Part II explores Bliss’s awkward 
relationship with Richard Nixon, who clumsily forced Bliss out as 
Republican national chairman after the 1968 election in a way that 
foreshadowed the ultimate demise of Nixon’s presidency. Part III 
examines some issues of civil rights and race relations that arose at various 
points during Bliss’s career, and Part IV asks whether Bliss could have 
succeeded in the modern political environment. 
I.  OVERVIEW 
Bliss was born in Akron on December 16, 1907.5 Except for his time 
in Washington as Republican National Committee (RNC) chair, he spent 
virtually all of his seventy-three years in his hometown.6 After high 
school, he enrolled at the University of Akron, where he was an indifferent 
student.7 His main focus was campus politics: he led the Hilltop Party, 
independent candidate for the Governor’s Council, which must approve most gubernatorial 
appointments and state contracts. At the time, 4 of its 8 members were in jail or under indictment for 
corruption. The member from our district did not face formal charges, but he was a long-term 
incumbent who might be charitably described as a rascal. Lewie discovered that state law did not 
require independent candidates to be registered voters, so several weeks shy of his 17th birthday he 
declared his candidacy even though the minimum voting age at the time was 21. He withdrew after 
the secretary of state filed emergency legislation to close that loophole. 
3. WILLIAM L. HERSHEY & JOHN C. GREEN, MR. CHAIRMAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RAY 
C. BLISS (2017). 
4. The book contains 71 chapters, none longer than 9 pages, so it is easy to read incrementally 
but can be readily digested in longer installments. 
5. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 5. 
6. He died on August 6, 1981. Id. at 316. During his early childhood, his family lived briefly 
in West Virginia and California but returned to Akron while Ray was in elementary school. Id. at 6. 
7. Id. at 10, 13. Bliss was not the only political figure who had a mixed academic record.
President George W. Bush referred to his mediocre college performance in a graduation speech at his 
alma mater: “And to the C students I say, you, too, can be President of the United States.” GEORGE 
W. BUSH, Commencement Address at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, I PUB. PAPERS 
556, 556 (May 21, 2001) (part of a speech full of self-deprecation about his time at Yale). 
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which he transformed into the dominant student faction or “political 
combine.”8 But in what was supposed to be his final semester, the 
Hilltoppers stuffed the ballot boxes in the election for May Queen to help 
Bliss’s girlfriend, Ellen Palmer, whom he would eventually marry.9 
Although his precise role in that episode remains ambiguous, Bliss 
accepted responsibility for the shenanigans and was expelled just a few 
weeks before his scheduled 1931 graduation.10 
Bliss followed a friend’s advice to volunteer with the local 
Republican organization, where he came under the wing of long-time 
county chairman James A. Corey.11 Moving quickly up the ladder, he was 
appointed to a GOP seat on the Summit County Board of Elections, where 
he served from 1935 until 1978.12 And Bliss succeeded Corey in 1942 
after his mentor’s death.13 He received the additional portfolio of 
Republican state chairman in the wake of the 1948 Dewey-Defeats-
Truman election in which Democrats made sweeping gains in Ohio.14 
Bliss retained both of these positions until he became head of the party’s 
national committee in 1965.15 
8. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
9. Id. at 14–15. The courtship lasted three decades, because Ellen was Catholic and Bliss’s 
Protestant mother objected to her son’s marrying someone of that faith. Id. at 6, 108. His mother’s 
views mattered because Bliss lived in the family home with her until she died in 1956. Id. at 8. Ray 
was the only one of her three children to survive childhood, and she lost her husband in a construction 
accident soon after her youngest child died. Id. at 5–7. 
10. Id. at 15–16. The university quietly awarded his degree four years later. Id. at 28. Bliss
later served two stints on the board of trustees, including a brief period as chair. Id. at 301–02, 305. 
11. Id. at 17–18. Summit County Republicans apparently were more receptive to volunteers
than Chicago Democrats were nearly two decades later. University of Chicago law student Abner 
Mikva, who later served in Congress, as chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, and as White House counsel, was rebuffed in his effort to volunteer for the 1948 
campaigns of Senator Paul Douglas and Governor Adlai Stevenson. A local party functionary told 
him: “We don’t want nobody nobody sent.” Cynthia Grant Bowman, “We Don’t Want Anybody 
Anybody Sent”: The Death of Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 57 (1991). 
12. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 26, 297. 
13. Id. at 40. 
14. Id. at 59. “Dewey Defeats Truman” was the famously incorrect headline in the early edition 
of the Chicago Tribune the morning after the election. The polls and the pundits predicted that 
Governor Thomas E. Dewey would defeat President Harry Truman, but Truman campaigned 
relentlessly and pulled off an upset victory. See GARY A. DONALDSON, TRUMAN DEFEATS DEWEY 
(1999); ZACHARY KARABELL, THE LAST CAMPAIGN: HOW HARRY TRUMAN WON THE 1948 
ELECTION (2000); see also BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION 
FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954) (a classic study of how voters decided whom to 
support in the 1948 election). 
15. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 159. 
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As a political operative, he lost his share of elections—including the 
very first campaign that he managed in 1934.16 But Bliss had a keen 
strategic mind, such as encouraging owners of rubber factories to 
reschedule their annual closing for maintenance during election week 
instead of earlier in the year, a ploy that led many workers to leave town 
temporarily and helped to tip a closely contested Akron municipal election 
to the Republicans.17 More importantly, he was open to innovation. As 
early as 1935, he began using public opinion polling to inform 
campaigns,18 and he saw the value of television starting in 1950, when he 
arranged for live coverage of speeches and panel discussions featuring 
reporters questioning his candidate.19 
Bliss’s unlikely TV star was Senator Robert A. Taft, who faced a 
surprisingly difficult reelection campaign. Bliss enthusiastically 
supported Taft’s unsuccessful runs for the GOP presidential nomination 
in 1940, 1948, and 1952.20 Widely known as “Mr. Republican,” the 
senator was part of a venerable political family: son of President and Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft21 and father of Robert A. Taft, Jr., who 
served in both houses of Congress at various times during the 1960’s and 
1970’s.22 
16. Id. at 26. 
17. Id. at 35. 
18. Id. at 27. 
19. Id. at 66. 
20. Id. at 39, 56–57, 70–71. Bliss also favored Taft for the 1944 presidential nomination, but
the senator chose to seek reelection instead. Id. at 50. 
21. Id. at 37. 
22. Id. at 132–33, 282. Although Hershey & Green do not mention them, several other
members of the Taft family also had political careers. For example, the patriarch of the family, 
William Howard Taft’s father, Alphonso, held local offices in Cincinnati and served as Secretary of 
War and Attorney General in the final year of President Grant’s second term. See RON CHERNOW, 
GRANT 823, 825 (2017); JAMES T. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 
10 (1972). Robert A. Taft’s brother, Charles P. Taft, helped to reform Cincinnati’s local government, 
serving many years on city council and also as mayor, and was the Republican gubernatorial nominee 
in 1952. See id. at 124–25, 127–29, 508–09; Blake Vick Bartlett, Charles Phelps Taft, 21 AMERICAN 
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 252 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes gen. eds., 1999); Joseph B. Treaster, 
Charles P. Taft, Former Mayor of Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1983, at 14. After Bliss’s death, 
the son of Robert A. Taft, Jr., became the fourth generation of the family in public office. Robert A. 
Taft II, who went by Bob, served two terms as Ohio’s secretary of state and two terms as governor. 
See generally Joe Hallett, The Taft Era, 1999–2007, in OHIO POLITICS 229 (Alexander P. Lamis & 
Brian Usher eds., 2d ed. 2007). Charles Taft’s son Seth also had a brief political career. See infra note 
69. And Kingsley A. Taft, a distant relative of these Tafts, served more than 21 years on the Ohio
Supreme Court, including 7 as chief justice, after holding several other offices. See Kingsley Arter 
Taft, www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/taft.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2018); see 
also infra note 32. 
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Taft was just one of many significant politicians with whom Bliss 
worked during his career. Other leading characters were John W. Bricker, 
who served three terms as governor and two terms in the U.S. Senate and 
was the Republican nominee for vice president in 1944;23 John H. Glenn, 
whom Bliss tried unsuccessfully to recruit to the Republicans and who 
later served four terms in the U.S. Senate as a Democrat;24 C. William 
O’Neill, a political prodigy who won a seat as a state representative as a 
twenty-two-year-old college student, became speaker at the age of thirty, 
and was elected attorney general at thirty-four and governor at forty;25 and 
James A. Rhodes, the only person ever to win four four-year terms as 
governor of Ohio.26 
Governors O’Neill and Rhodes both clashed with Bliss over party 
leadership. Some of these conflicts were inevitable, as governors have 
both official responsibilities and concerns about their political prospects, 
whereas party chairs like Bliss focus on creating a strong overall ticket. 
Patronage issues illustrate the tension. Bliss professed indifference on that 
subject but recognized the long-term political value of patronage.27 Direct 
negotiation finessed certain conflicts.28 
But other clashes were more serious. With Governor O’Neill, the 
battle involved an effort to undermine labor unions. Ohio business leaders 
pressed for a right-to-work amendment to the state constitution. Ignoring 
warnings from Bliss and Senator Bricker that this gambit would enrage 
union members, who then made up about one-third of the work force, the 
proposal reached the 1958 ballot with O’Neill’s support.29 The warnings 
proved prescient: the right-to-work measure failed in a landslide, 
Governor O’Neill was routed, Senator Bricker went down narrowly, and 
the Republicans lost almost all of the other statewide offices as well as 
both chambers of the legislature and three seats in Congress.30 
23. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 37, 39, 50–51, 56, 280. 
24. Id. at 134–35. 
25. Id. at 84, 89. O’Neill was the youngest member of the General Assembly when he was first 
elected, and he was the youngest speaker and attorney general in state history. Id. at 84. For more on 
O’Neill, see infra text accompanying note 30; note 32. 
26. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 130. 
27. Id. at 42, 93. 
28. Id. at 93–94, 131, 133. 
29. Id. at 95–96, 98–100. 
30. Id. at 102. Bricker’s opponent was Stephen M. Young, a 69-year-old former state legislator 
and member of Congress who ran as a sacrificial lamb because most Democrats regarded Bricker as 
invulnerable. Id. at 99. The crusty Young not only defeated Bricker but was reelected to a second 
term, see infra note 37, despite his penchant for responding to irate constituent letters with pungent 
comments such as: “What else is new?” JOSEPH S. CLARK, CONGRESS: THE SAPLESS BRANCH 57 
(1964). 
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With Governor Rhodes, the conflict involved the 1964 presidential 
contest. Bliss wanted Ohio to send a delegation to the Republican National 
Convention that was committed to a favorite-son candidate so that the 
state could have more leverage in selecting the nominee.31 Bliss feared 
that frontrunner Senator Barry Goldwater could not win the general 
election and might doom the national party to the sort of shellacking that 
the Ohio GOP suffered in the 1958 right-to-work debacle. The Buckeye 
State’s delegates initially agreed to cast their first-ballot votes for 
Governor Rhodes. Just days before the convention, however, Rhodes 
released the delegates without warning Bliss of his move. The resulting 
breach was healed only with difficulty at the time, and Rhodes eventually 
took control of the state party in a way that led to erosion of its overall 
vitality.32 
The 1964 dispute illuminates how Bliss envisioned the role of a party 
leader: as an “office chairman” focused on building an effective party 
infrastructure rather than as a “speaking chairman” who articulated policy 
positions.33 He did have views on the issues, and those views led him to 
be a Republican.34 But he wanted both to win elections and to promote 
good government, which he regarded as good politics.35 He was always 
looking for promising candidates and refused to apply strict ideological 
tests. For Bliss, it was crucial to have good candidates who could run 
competitively in their constituencies even if they disagreed with other 
candidates on some issues; the chairman should facilitate the process by 
which the party came to agreement on an overall platform.36 
Goldwater did secure the presidential nomination in 1964, and his 
historic landslide defeat in the general election confirmed Bliss’s worst 
31. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 139. 
32. Id. at 141–42, 279–80. O’Neill and Rhodes crossed paths later. After O’Neill lost his 1958 
reelection campaign for governor, he won a seat on the Ohio Supreme Court in 1960. He became 
chief justice following the death of Kingsley Taft, see supra note 22, making him the only person to 
lead all three branches of state government: speaker, governor, and chief justice. C. William O’Neill, 
www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/oneill.asp (last visited January 18, 2018). 
(This Justice O’Neill should not be confused with Justice William M. O’Neill, a Democrat who was 
elected in 2012 and resigned in January 2018 to run for governor.) Meanwhile, Rhodes was elected 
governor in 1962 and reelected in 1966. He announced that he would seek a third term in 1974 but 
had to go to the state supreme court to run again because of a two-term limit for executive officers. 
Id. at 291. The court, led by Chief Justice O’Neill, held that the limit applied only to consecutive 
terms, not to total terms. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Brown, 296 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 1973) (per curiam).  
33. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at xiv, 50, 182, 240, 275. 
34. Id. at xiv. 
35. Id. at 50. 
36. Id. at 44–45, 178. 
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fears.37 Early in 1965, Bliss was chosen as the new Republican national 
chairman.38 In that role, he would rebuild a party that some observers 
regarded as doomed.39 And facing that challenge brought Richard Nixon 
back into Bliss’s political life. 
II. BLISS AND NIXON
Bliss approached the resuscitation of the national party in much the 
same way as he led the rebuilding of the Ohio GOP in the wake of 
electoral failures in 1948 and 1958: consistent focus on revitalizing party 
structures down to the local level, broad outreach to both traditional party 
supporters and constituencies that Republicans previously had ignored, 
promotion of party unity by engaging a variety of views while rejecting 
extremism, and vigorous fundraising.40 He did all this with his typical 
attention to even the smallest detail, from the number of pens and paper 
cups at party functions to the type of cushions that national convention 
delegates would sit on and the number of urinals in the convention hall.41 
These efforts paid dividends early, as the party made strong gains in the 
1966 midterm election.42 
Richard Nixon barnstormed the nation in support of GOP candidates 
that year. This was part of the former vice president’s effort to resurrect 
his political career following his narrow loss to John F. Kennedy in the 
1960 presidential election and disastrous defeat in the 1962 California 
gubernatorial contest. Nixon credited Bliss with helping him carry Ohio 
in 1960 despite losing nationally to Kennedy.43 
So Bliss welcomed Nixon’s willingness to campaign for Republican 
candidates in 1966. But the two men soon got cross-wise with each other. 
At one point, Nixon asked the national committee to pick up part of his 
travel expenses. Bliss, anticipating that Nixon would seek the 1968 
presidential nomination in a contest that might attract a large field, 
refused. He explained that the RNC could not spend its money on one 
37. Id. at 147–48. The Democratic tide in Ohio was so strong that Senator Stephen Young, see 
supra note 30, slipped past Robert A. Taft, Jr., for a second term. Id. at 148. Young retired after that 
term. Taft finally won the seat in 1970, barely edging the term-limited Governor Rhodes in the 
primary and future Senator Howard Metzenbaum in the general election. Id. at 280, 282. But 
Metzenbaum captured the seat in a 1976 rematch. Id. at 295. 
38. Id. at 157. 
39. Id. at 148. 
40. Id. at 168–69, 176–84, 193–98. 
41. Id. at 75, 218. 
42. Id. at 208. 
43. Id. at 123–24. 
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potential candidate lest that be seen as an implicit endorsement of that 
candidate. This enraged Nixon, who closed a profanity-laced telephone 
call by warning: “All right, Ray, but remember this, I don’t forget these 
things.”44 
Nixon ultimately received the 1968 nomination and won the 
presidential election. Bliss felt deep ambivalence about the outcome, 
telling his wife: “I don’t know whether I did the country a service or a 
disservice.”45 He was much happier about another result: Ohio Attorney 
General William B. Saxbe won Robert A. Taft’s old seat in the U.S. 
Senate.46 
Within two weeks of the election, reports began circulating that 
Nixon wanted to replace Bliss with a new national chairman.47 This 
should not have come as a surprise, because the presidential nominee 
generally decides who should lead the national committee. And if the 
nominee wins the White House, the president has an even stronger basis 
for making the choice. After all, a chief executive has relied on a personal 
campaign organization, political advisors, and fundraisers. Beyond these 
general considerations, Nixon still held his grudge from 1966 over Bliss’s 
refusal to cover his travel expenses while campaigning for GOP 
candidates.48 
But Nixon handled the transition very poorly. Press reports made 
clear that he wanted to replace Bliss.49 Less than two weeks before the 
inauguration, Nixon met with Bliss but did not press him to resign.50 
Meanwhile, the president-elect dispatched Murray Chotiner, a long-time 
advisor who was regarded as aggressive even by those who viewed him 
positively and as a hatchet man by less sympathetic observers, to the 
national committee.51 Bliss and Chotiner did not get along at all.52 
44. Id. at 205. 
45. Id. at 238. 
46. Id. at 237. With Bliss’s support, Saxbe had successfully challenged C. William O’Neill’s
successor as speaker, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, and succeeded O’Neill as attorney 
general, HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 76–77, 92. Senator Saxbe eventually became U.S. 
attorney general after Eliot L. Richardson and William D. Ruckelshaus resigned in protest of President 
Nixon’s order to fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox. Nixon nominated Saxbe, who had 
bluntly criticized some of his policies, because only someone enjoying bipartisan respect could gain 
Senate confirmation after the Saturday Night Massacre. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF 
WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 406–09, 426 (1990). 
47. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 239. 
48. Id. at 240. 
49. Id. at 242–43. 
50. Id. at 251–52. 
51. Id. at 261–62. 
52. Id. at 262, 264. 
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Nixon’s original plan was to have co-chairs, in Bliss’s terms a 
“speaking chairman” who would be the public face of the party and an 
“office chairman” who would direct organizational aspects; Chotiner was 
to be the “office chairman.”53 Nixon wanted Representative Rogers C.B. 
Morton of Maryland as the “speaking chairman.”54 But Morton, like Bliss, 
could not abide Chotiner and refused to work with him.55 Bliss thought 
highly of Morton,56 whose brother, Senator Thruston B. Morton of 
Kentucky, had chaired the RNC a decade earlier.57 Once it became clear 
that Chotiner would be out and that Rogers Morton would lead the 
national committee by himself, Bliss announced his retirement effective 
April 15, 1969.58 
The melodrama surrounding Bliss’s departure was completely 
unnecessary. Bliss was a veteran political operative who understood the 
presidential nominee’s prerogatives, and he also was a loyal Republican. 
Perhaps the soap opera could have been avoided had he tendered a pro 
forma resignation after the election.59 But he also thought that the national 
party would benefit from stable leadership, which helped to account for 
the success of the Summit County and Ohio GOP during his years at the 
helm.60 
Even if they thought it presumptuous for the national chairman to 
want to stay on, Nixon and his aides regarded Bliss as an enemy to be 
outmaneuvered rather than as an elder statesman to be honored and 
gracefully moved to the side. Indeed, some advisors disparaged Bliss’s 
political skills despite his success in Ohio and his national efforts in the 
wake of the Goldwater debacle.61 Nixon’s approach to Bliss reflected the 
insularity and suspicion that affected his approach to many matters. Bliss 
recognized this problem as early as 1970, complaining that Nixon had 
surrounded himself with a team of sycophants who generally went along 
with whatever he wanted to do.62 
That insularity and suspicion culminated in the Watergate scandal, 
which ultimately doomed Nixon’s presidency. At the height of the crisis, 
53. Id. at 240–41. 
54. Id. at 263. 
55. Id. at 267–68. 
56. Id. at 263. 
57. Id. at 115, 125. 
58. Id. at 266. 
59. Id. at 246. 
60. Id. at 278. 
61. Id. at 239, 241–42. 
62. Id. at 287. 
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Nixon asked Bliss for public support. White House aide Bryce Harlow, an 
old acquaintance who had played a role in the plot to oust him as national 
chairman, warned Bliss against making any statement because Nixon was 
“guilty as sin.”63 Nixon resigned just over three months later.64 
III. RACE RELATIONS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Civil rights issues had a prominent place on the political agenda 
during the years that Bliss led the local, state, and national parties. The 
authors make clear that he was “a man of his time” who sometimes used 
racial and ethnic slurs in private conversation.65 But he also supported 
civil rights for African Americans and did not want the GOP to be 
identified with segregationists like Senator Strom Thurmond of South 
Carolina, the former Democrat (and 1948 Dixiecrat presidential 
candidate) who had become a Republican in 1964.66 And he admired his 
mentor Corey for having stood up to the Ku Klux Klan at the height of its 
influence in Akron during the 1920’s.67 
As a party leader, Bliss reached out to black voters even at the risk 
of alienating some whites.68 He did so for pragmatic reasons. Even if the 
GOP could not win a majority among African Americans, the party could 
at least increase its support; Bliss always sought to make inroads in areas 
where Republicans competed weakly.69 So he was delighted to learn, 
while serving as a trustee of the University of Akron, that a black 
colleague was a Republican because she wanted to belong to the party of 
63. Id. at 247–48, 287–88. 
64. Id. at 288. 
65. Id. at 214. His use of anti-Semitic language was especially surprising because he owned
and operated an insurance agency with three Jewish partners. Id. at 53, 214. 
66. Id. at 211. 
67. Id. at 20–21, 214; see supra text accompanying note 11. 
68. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 48, 176, 188, 210–11. 
69. Id. at 126–27, 200, 210, 235–36, 237. Bliss seems not to have played a role in a couple of
race-related situations in his home area of Northeast Ohio. There is no mention of the 1967 Cleveland 
election in which Carl B. Stokes became the first African-American mayor of a major American city. 
He narrowly defeated Seth Taft. See LEONARD N. MOORE, CARL B. STOKES AND THE RISE OF BLACK 
POLITICAL POWER 58–60 (2002); see also id. at 181–82 (noting that Stokes supported Taft in his 
successful race for county commissioner in 1970); supra note 22 (detailing Taft’s genealogy). Nor is 
there any mention of the controversy in Akron, where in 1964 the city council enacted a fair-housing 
ordinance and the voters responded by amending the city charter to require such measures to be 
approved by referendum. The Supreme Court invalidated the charter amendment because that 
provision singled out fair-housing measures for less favorable treatment than other types of legislation 
and noted that the charter already allowed opponents of local ordinances to initiate a referendum to 
repeal them. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
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Lincoln rather than join the Democrats, who had been the party of 
segregation.70 
Bliss did not make civil rights a partisan issue, but others have done 
so. For example, the Republican National Committee’s website 
emphasizes that Chief Justice Earl Warren, author of the opinion in Brown 
v. Board of Education,71 was a Republican and that the Civil Rights Act
of 196472 passed when GOP leader Senator Everett Dirksen “defeat[ed] 
[a] Democrat [sic] filibuster.”73 But the facts are more complex than the 
RNC’s summary suggests. All of the other justices who subscribed to the 
unanimous Brown opinion—which the website incorrectly describes as 
the “majority opinion”74—were appointed by Democratic presidents.75 
And while segregationists in the South generally were Democrats, 
including those who filibustered the Civil Rights Act, that bill was a top 
priority for President Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic congressional 
leadership, and it passed with overwhelming bipartisan support.76 
Moreover, in stark contrast to most congressional Republicans, the two 
iconic conservative GOP presidential candidates of modern times vocally 
opposed federal civil rights legislation in the 1960’s. Barry Goldwater 
voted against the 1964 act.77 And Ronald Reagan opposed not only that 
70. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 312. 
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
72. Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h–6 
(2012)). 
73. Republican National Committee, Founding of the Republican Party, 
www.gop.com/history/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). 
74. Chief Justice Warren worked diligently to secure unanimity on what had been a badly
divided Court following the initial round of arguments under his predecessor. See generally RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678–99 (1976); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND 
HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 72–101 (1983). 
75. Justice Harold H. Burton, formerly mayor of Cleveland and senator from Ohio, was a
Republican appointed by President Truman. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 39. The other seven 
justices were Democrats appointed by Truman and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
76. Senator Dirksen and other congressional Republicans did play important roles in the
adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generally ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: 
LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
(1996); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
(2014); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
77. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 147, 210. Goldwater also supported the filibuster by 
voting against the successful cloture motion that allowed the bill to come to a vote in the Senate. 
ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, BARRY GOLDWATER 196 (1995). He was out of office when other civil 
rights statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 78–79, were enacted. He did not seek reelection to 
the Senate in 1964 and was elected to the Senate again in November 1968, after those other measures 
were adopted. See GOLDBERG, supra, at 234, 249–51, 253–55. 
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measure but also the Voting Rights Act of 196578 and the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968.79 During his presidency, Reagan’s administration pursued a 
number of policies that were viewed as hostile to civil rights. A notable 
example was its willingness to grant tax exemptions to racially 
discriminatory private schools, a policy that the Supreme Court rejected 
in Bob Jones University v. United States.80 In short, Bliss was wise not to 
exaggerate the partisan aspects of civil rights. Both parties can claim 
credit for advances in that area, but both parties also have some troubling 
history on the subject. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Ray Bliss was highly competitive and wanted to win, but he believed 
in more than winning. He favored a strong system of two parties that could 
serve as a check on each other and thereby promote effective 
government.81 Despite, or perhaps because of, the May Queen ballot-box-
stuffing scandal during his college years, Bliss as a political operative 
tried to play things straight. For example, in 1958 he insisted on checking 
on a discrepancy in local election returns; his efforts resulted in a victory 
for a Democratic candidate for state senate over the Republican who 
initially appeared to have triumphed.82 And he insisted on keeping his 
insurance business entirely separate from his political work.83 
78. Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10702 
(2012)). 
79. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–90 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012)); see LOU CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO 
POWER 142–43 (2003); MATTHEW DALLEK, THE RIGHT MOMENT: RONALD REAGAN’S FIRST 
VICTORY AND THE DECISIVE TURNING POINT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 188, 199–200 (2000); RONNIE 
DUGGER, ON REAGAN: THE MAN & HIS PRESIDENCY 198–99 (1983). Reagan also supported 
Proposition 14, a 1964 California initiative that repealed the state’s fair-housing law and prohibited 
similar measures. DALLEK, supra, at 226; see generally Thomas W. Casstevens, California’s Rumford 
Act and Proposition 14, in THE POLITICS OF FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION: STATE AND LOCAL CASE 
STUDIES 237, 261–81 (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas W. Casstevens eds., 1968). The courts struck down 
Proposition 14 as unconstitutional. Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), aff’d, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967). Meanwhile, Reagan was elected governor on a platform calling for legislative repeal of the 
fair-housing law and later supported a bill to restrict the scope of the law; neither proposal passed. 
CANNON, supra, at 201–05; Casstevens, supra, at 284; Raymond E. Wolfinger & Fred I. Greenstein, 
The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM POL. SCI. REV. 
753, 768 (1968).  
80. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
81. HERSHEY & GREEN, supra note 3, at 166, 277, 283, 325. 
82. Id. at 107. 
83. Id. at 55, 252. The only hint of scandal affecting Bliss involved his top aide at the RNC,
whom he fired for breaking into the desk of the party’s outgoing national finance director. Id. at 173–
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Politics has changed significantly since Bliss left the political stage. 
Parties are less structured than Bliss wanted. Indeed, he clashed with 
Governors O’Neill and Rhodes precisely because they wanted to 
consolidate power in their offices at the expense of the broader and deeper 
organization that Bliss favored. Moreover, much of modern campaigning 
involves computers and social media that have developed since Bliss’s 
time. We might wonder how he would have functioned in this 
environment. 
Answering that question requires considerable speculation. But Bliss 
adapted to other innovations. Recall his use of polls beginning in 1935 
and his use of television in Senator Robert A. Taft’s 1950 reelection 
campaign. His openness to these resources suggests that he would at least 
have approached new technology and communication systems with an 
open mind. 
More important than this speculation, Ray Bliss had an old-fashioned 
faith in the two-party system. He had strong views on public policy, but 
he also believed in effective government. He understood that today’s 
winners could well be tomorrow’s losers, so holding out for the perfect 
solution might prevent the acceptance of a good one. In an era of 
candidate-focused parties that are increasingly polarized ideologically and 
at times seem more interested in scoring rhetorical points than governing, 
someone like Bliss might seem like an anachronism. Hershey and Green 
have painted a rich portrait of an important political figure. They do not 
purport to tell us how to reform the current morass, but their book might 
provide some inspiration for those of us who believe that our broken 
system can and must be fixed. 
74. This internecine dispute related to an intraparty factional conflict and had nothing to do with
corruption. 
